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If f dGspite his oritioisms and stions f I have left
I am espeoially indebted to Stlpervisor, Mr. Ng Kim Besh,
who despite his preocOllpations as management consultant to an aeency
as w 11 as b i lecturer in the Faculty of Economics and Administration
of t e University ot qa, read this Gradua:tion Ex rcise with
inoomparable kindness and understanding t and offered very holpful
S\l6B'8stions. I am also very grateful to him tor not only allowing
e ace as to his 0 oaks, but also to borrow library boo in his
:lal:19.
rrora unoorrected, they are of oow-se my sole responsibility.
Also, if' thin Graduation Exercise is - inadequ.a:be in any t183, I alone
am responsible.
To all tho 8 in the Paca.lty staff of the University ot Mal�a
ho have helped m in one w83 or another, I also wish 1;0 reoord a liard
of' tha.!lk1l.
I am. also thankfUl to Mr. Wong ICah Soon tor having dovoted
such p lance and oa.re to typing this Graduation Exercise.
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ST OPSIS
Thi Gradllation Exercio is mainly an attempt to 6tu� and
the Theory of Games and its applica.tions. Here, greater
mphasis is given to the section on the n-person game since thi
field has not been fUlly e�lored by other writers.
In apter One, a 8tu� is made on the basic concept of
G Theory. The elements involved in the Theory is also discussed
in this chapter. Du consideration is also given to the elementary
features found in a game.
Chapter Two is devoted to the exposition of the two-peroon,
zero-oum game. This is the simplest game in Game Theory. Here only
two parties ar considered.
Chapter !brae contains the discussion of the applications
of t o-persou, zero-sum games. Business problGmB are diSCUDsod here.
An xample is al 0 given in this ch.a.pt r. The latter part of the
cJhapter deals ith non-Hro-sum games.
Chapter Four takes up the discussion on the conoepts of
n-person games. The applications of n-person games io also daalt ldth
here.
In the concluding part of the chapter, four models are
formulatod and the solutions are found tor all the models.
- iv-
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CHAPma 1
GAME X>� AND 1'l'S APPLICAl);'IONS
What is Q$lO eory?
Game thoiJry is a m�thod £'or the studiY' of decision-maldng insituations of oonfliot. 2 It deals t'1ith problems in umoll the individu01 io a.i r io not in oomplete oontrol of the factors inf'lueneine ·theoutoome. A. noral hose foroes faoe tll. enem.Yt an indUlltrialiot whosoproducts at oomplete with those of another indnstrialiDt, a financeOOOO('''Ul;ive ho has to evaluate and eelcot invest..'U8nt proposals, a p1a.vsrin a pok I' gane, duelists, politicians fighting for a ooination andbridge pleyc:!'D. all involved in tt1"�leG uhich we � classify asr; .10 Huaiiions.
The easence of a. galtle problem is tha.t it involves individualslith different BOols or objootives uhosc fates are in erlocked. Thereare many xamplss of docision-making 3 lIhore this is not so. An
arc it ct uho has b en allotted a opecified cum of. money in ordor to
CarTY out a. given buildi.ng program or an eflo�ne l' ollg'dged in redeoieningan indw.rtrial proco 0 in order to cut cost of produotion are not involvedin a. .a situ tion. Tho ongineer and arohitect face direot minimizationor r.ta.:ri ization proble in which they are in control of tho relevant�ariablas and do not have to contend with anti-eiginee�B or anti-architects17ho try to destroy thoir t ark. The architect mS3 try to maximize oertain:features of tho quality and quantity of building tha.t he Call get dono forthr. w.ount of monoy at his dispoaal. The o�neer triee to mini.'niza cootsfor the output of ;cods rc . red. Theca tla.,y be forces \ hioh they do notcontrol, such as the woather; but in r.toat CaGeD aone physical influonoeB�)(i�.TheDe are ....ames against nature.
1. Classical souroe: Von l-leumann and Ocka.r or{Jeru::torn, 'l'h ory ofGamos and Economio Behaviour, 2nd �ditiont Princeton Univeroity Preen,Prinoeton, Ne York, 1947.
lckinsey, J. C., Introduction to the Theory of Oamos, roGrau-HillBook Company, �lc r York, 1952, Ch pter I.
2.
3. For further dotails, see Luco, R. D. and H. Raiffa. Games and Deoisions,Introduotion and Critical SUl'VeYt John Wiley & Sons, Ino •• !feu York, 1957 ..
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On the bn: tlefi 10. 4 l'lO ma.y assume that the opposing 8'Onerel
i consoioualy trying to thwart our purposes. 'l'he rival firm in business
!!ley be actively eneagod in taking our ouatomers awe;:}' from tw. In the
firat cas 0 do not have a came situation; in the other case 10 do.
The problem of gar.1e theory is "ore dl.ffioult than that of
simple rnnxi.'l1is tion. The individual han to ·ork out hOli to achieve as
l'IlUeli 3'l poooiblc. aki in 0 account that t ere are otheN \,.hose goalo
are different d hooe actions h�vo an effeot on all. A dooisio�aker
in a 5'"IJ1l0 faces a cross--purpooes maxirni?.ation problem. He must :plaxr'''for
an optimal turn, taking into account the possible actions of is
opponentc. iIllere info . tion of competitor's behaviour is ave.ilable,
it io ponaible to clioooo that decision which oa.ximizos the fim' expeot d
return or the effeots of th rival's counter-moves are taken into
oonsideration. Procedures which resemble this ar� frequently e o�untorod
in business practioe. But it is often against the competitor's interests
to permit thi� Bort ot a caloulation. tan ment m� therefore �void
too obvious a pa.ttorn in its deciSion- aking in order to keep the
opposition gaes ing. W hen it suoceeds in this goal, no suoh simple
prediction of competitive behaviour will be possible. Thus it is
necessary to adopt other approach to the analysis of competitive
beh rieur. This approach is more deductive. Instead of aelc:ing,
inductivoly, that Ie can infer from tho competitor's past beheViour.
one se ks to dct rmine a rival's most profitable counter-stratcS1 to
one '0 0 m "bost·' evoc and to formula.te tho appropriate defensivo
measures. This is the approach of game theory.
• ,.cDonald John, Strategy in Poker, BIlsineGo and War: W.W. lorton &: Co.,r ow York, 1950.
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2. The 'le�ents of Game The0r.l:
The Elle�ents fhich desoribe a. poker 5 B'al'ilO are the plt.\Yero,
"on y, pack of ca...'"'Ci£l. a oet of rules denorioine ho the games are
pla-yed, hich hands in in any situa.tion that can arise, and what i:nfor.. er­
tion conaitiona there are at � stage of the gar:lc. The clcments hiob
d sor!b the situ· tio 01" tor l.rms in an advortising campaign are t110
tlO Deta of individuals in control of the decision of both firms, the
amounts of money available, the information state, the market forecasts
of the effeot of different t,-pes of' advertising 6, and tho various laws
and physical c nditionc which delineate which actions are legally or
physically possible. The situation in which two opposing fiold oomanders
rna.y find the "'elves oan be desoribed in torms of th� number ot men a.t
their disposal, the amount of equipment, their informa.tion d intolli-
.
nce services, tho terrain of the battlefield and weather conditions
Md th ir v uation of the iopor't;anc of voriou objectivon.
All tho a.bove e:xampl�s obY"lou$ly have a comaon cor;:}. A gtlme
is d��crib d in term cf the players or individual decision-u cers, tt�
rules of the gaQe t the Pa.Yoffs or oubccaeo of tho Game, th valua.tions
that "he pla.y-ers assign to various peyoffs. tIlO \"'ariables that each
plaser oontrols, cnd thn informa.tion oondi tiorul that e.xi:J't d'J.rine the
game.
These olouonto, co�on to ell oituations of conflict 1, are
the building blocks of gamo theory. The r pl.cy the same role in this
theory D.O do par ticl�s and foroes i a theol'S of mcch�Jics. 'rho pleyers
and the I'll s of the game provide a desoription of' t.•o physical situat10n
and. th attempt of the pl'\Yerc to mu.:rir.lize or to acmeve SOlJC individual
goal provides �he motiv,tion or fore.
player in a. game is an autonomous deciSion-making unit.
A pla,yer is not necessarily one pez-eonj it mey be a group of individuals
actint; in an organisa.tion, a. firm, or an a:rmy. The fec.ture tha.t dis­
tine;ui he a pl�er is that it has an objecrtivo in the game and operates
undor its 0 ill orders in an attem�t to obtain its objootive.
Each pl�er is in control 01" some sets of rosources. In poker
these resources are cards and money; in busdneca corpor :tions they are
various aasetoi in war, men, armaments, and resources. These r souroes,
together 'ith the rul s of the garne, dcsoribin€ ho I tlley can be utilized,
enable us to ork out every alternative that is available to 3. pla_yor.
In oh cs 0 start \#ith a set of pieces placed on the board in a c rtain
manner; the rules tell us hOrl ea.ch piece can be movod ,
Kuhn, H. W., "A Simpl�ed Two-Porson Poker", .Annals of' .tathema.ties
Studios No. 24 Princeton (Princeton Univez-oity Press) 1950.
6. For a superb exposition, see "Game Theory Hodele in the Allocation of
Advertising Expenditur ", Operat ions Research t Vol. 6 No. 5 t Sept. 1958
(pp. 69 109).
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Givon th :t informatio • it lould be possible to t'lork out every posoible
:Ch·st nove th t io feasible in a. ohece gaao , Ao we
knOll the initial
...tri ution of the eneey'a men and the rul�B ooncernine
th i1' .ovement ,
"0 can also iork out every possible alternativo that
he can chooae for
his first mov. In faot, it io theor tically possible to
work out the
game of ohcee Iitho t cvc_.W'" pla.ring it
b oause oould oaloulate very �/
,o.3oible 1 of pl�ng t Cao8 beforehand. Practically
the computation
problct:'l is 00 j . nee to ca:rry out" but
"ite can i Lne 0. ana of chess
being pl<''3'ud in
• hich each p1a.ror 80es \lp to the r.-;fer ethan him a
book containin his oomplete otrat gy 8 for the game,
and the leaves.
Tho referee then orks out t e gwne according
to these instructiono.
A strategy for a choss game is a complete
set of instructions whioh
states how a ;>1 yer will make eVi ry move un il
the end of :the Game,
takinC into aoeourrt all information concozmng
the onE".my IS DOVOS. A
D Ll'c;tcQ' in '1a.-r or in business
is the same. It is 0. general plan of
action oOllta�linu instructions as to
u:lat to do in ev ry cOl1.tineC:1cy.
Thns, 1;h co:nmoJldi:ng neraJ. �v
tell hi� subordinates hot-I ho 11.mtS the
attnck to be in, th.n he ffi93" tell theD what
ile uan'bs done af'ter the first
part of tho atta.ck, dependins upon.
nhat tho enemy's acJ"ions have been up
to tnat point.
The outcome of' a game \llil1 depend upon
tho c·�I'ato.Jio9 crJ�:)loyed
by every p1a.rcr. Let us
call the sot cf' poacible otra;:;ogieo that tho
i th pl�er can uce Si. Thio
is the cct of '0very posziblo ilLtl of action
that the i th 'Pla,y r Cal have t t �n into
cccourrt hiG resources t what
he can do it!l hom, and also taki
in" 0 account ever,}' pcosibll; act by
his opponents. Suppoac that the i
th plu\yer selects a atra'cct3;y 9i out
of all his nvailablo -zrategies
8i. rho outcome 01' tne �alil� to him aill
depend upon \1ho;� he did and.
what hie opponerrtc did. Hi� payoff is a
function of the Btro;tegies employed by all the plaJ'ers.
tie can denote
tho p�off to �'e i th player by the p&yoff
function Pi (S11 �2' S�1".¥ Sn).
The oGsible :peyoffc in chess are t'1in, lose,
or dr31f; in poker tl10y al'e
va ious sum of money] in
bumneae t protits and grolnh. In every
case
each pl�cr must have a method of
valuation or a utility 9 function whioh
en bloc him to decide whether
or not OUe payoff is bettor than another.
In busin SD, and in games
the pc\y<>ff' Oa3" be in money, and there mtl3'
be
no difficUlty in distinguishing
bet'tfOen a PBJoft of 1,000 or one of $200.
Ho ever, in many cas e
the p<\yoff can be complicated by other
�'actors.
The Co:npleat Strategyst. cGrro Hill
Book Compa.tl3,
8.
9.
William, J. D., ibid.
3uolJnt "Ut� lity Theory",
no.rvard Businec ... Roview, 44, pp.
124-25
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For instance, the payoff arioing from the follotdng one line of action
in bat 10 Q result in 1,000 enemy casualties at � cost of 200 mon
loot· anot or line 0 action, could result in 5,000 eneoy oasualties
at co '; of 2,000 me lost. It is difficult to sey l'Jhich is prefera.ble.
In c;encrnl, pl�rer has a valuation scheme 10 by ti'hich he
can muatc the lor h of an::! set of proopacto \dth which he is con­
fronted. For instance, e aseuee tha.t a. pl�er kno s whether or not he
lould r :thor ake a. profit of 10 million or 11 million.. The 6atne in
hlah he io 1'1
.
rn� be ouch tha.t he can nevor obtain a. profit of
10 million. This amounts to s�ng that the prospect of a profit of
o Dillion to a pl or is not a poooib1e payoff in this game.
11
e nOll formulate tho problem of game thoory. An
-percon game consists of a se-t of N players.J eac 1 in oontro) of a
set of stra.tegics Si, :1 :0: 1, 2t ••• , N; each p�eyor has a pe.,yoff funotion
Pi (S , S , ••• , ) whioh tells him Ihat prospeot he receives as his
p. ort if2eo.ch pl�er haD chosen his s ratogy ai.. Th 00 jeot of every
pl�er ill to att pt to obtain a. P83aff which yields him a prospect of
a,;dJ:\al v ue •
e technic t s described earlier give us a �ethod h reby
e con fo aliz any sort of ination involving conflict. For tho
nora! purposes of the game th orist this is v ry deSirable. Those of'
us intereste in mana.5emont nust ask: Can the general soheme be applied
to are of speoifio interest to us? . It turn out that the simplest sort
of .0 we oan discuss has several useful applioa.tions.
11.
arlin Shubik, na e Theory and R lated Approaches to S->ciol
�hav-.i.ou:r."
Sh �ley", L. S .. ttA Value for . It-People GaulCS".
Cont.ributioa t·� the
Theory of G es, Vol. II Pr1noeton;
Prinoeton Universitr Press, 1953,
pp. 307-318.
10.
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EaDie Concopt;on
on Zero-Sur.l Game:
.
s is a g. e in ilhioh the amount that one p1avrer locos is
preois ly the araount that the othel' p1ase1" ius. �lo-porson poker,
match' pennieo, and moat other two-parsen games are of this variety.
Coneid r a oonpetitive atru le for narket ohare by two firr.lo (duopoly)
cwmuaing thore is no pries 'Ior and col1 sion. lIere, cv�ry percentage
pint gaino1 by one of tho fi�E is neees�ar11y loot by the other.
Hero, liO have a ti"IC)o-person. zaro-m gane. U is oalled. zero-own because,
no matte:t tilw.t is dono by oithor oompoilitor, the total gain
.
n market
shnro to t e t 10 pleyers is zero, eo that the interests of the oom-
petitora are diamotrically opposed. In this exnmple, so long as thoir
number reilloias unchangcd , the share of w e IT.a.rket �lhich the two firms
nave b ... en thorn is neoessarily 100 per <,ont 12. t the game is zero­
sum only becauce of the natUl"e of' the oomPalW objeotives. Deoisions lhioh
are token by the £ir:.:Is !'!ley �ry 1.1011 ino:t'ease or reduoe both the absolute
size of their markot �d tho total profito of the "tt·;o tal:Cll1. together.
Inoreo.cod advortising ou:tl�y and prioo-outtu..,s- cay, f'or exwnple,
increase their oombined oales :1"01" 0 and reduoe ·�LOir profits, and. i
the ':iJ'us' obj ,::U"i"·o£ 'Iioro rJa.rimizc.tion of eith i- profit or sales ra�her
than market sh "l, the ,";;PJ10 hTould not bn of the zero-sue: variety.
Ho lov')r, there are 6ituntions in 1:msinosB and "1� whioh
can bo approxin,atad
by a zoro-sum modol.
trictly spoakinut t is is a "oonstant aum�· rathor ·�han a zero-sum
game because the sum of the
two market shares io the fixed numcor
100 (per oent), not zero. lloliGver, there is no signifioant analytic
differenco botl1oon the constan't sum and the zero-OUtl games.
This
is because thoro is no ohanue in stratel;io pos ibilitios
fro;:! a
ivan e to oth rein l'1hioh some eonatent amount that
oannot bo changed by tho pl�ers is added to tho oriBinal p�offG.
For further details. S30 Charneot A., and Cooper, W. W., "An Example
of Constrained Gac G in Industrial Beano i06," (Abstract),
Beon tricn, 22. Oot. 1954, p. 526_
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Guards only Ou.ard both Otlard. only
Hif)l't1<. rout�� lightly oun'iain road
Ilighucy 5 - 2 5
ountain Road 2 1 ,...
The relovant foatvee of a tuo-pcroon !:joro-aum game oan bo
diGpl�ed by ':a.king use of a pa:roff T.1a.trix. To illuotrato the centrol.
oon.:3eptc of the to-par on zero-sum gane, let un asGUr:lO an e pIe.
DSW. emu 1er haa tlo possible routos ovor th€ border: ono is down
t 0 hi .ll83 and the oth r thro 1 the �ta.ins. If he could go davIn
tho hi . unhampered, he could tclce a fully Loaded trl.l&t. and make a
ticzy profit. If there io a. liGht police {JIlard on tho main road, he
can avoid GrreGt '&.1t ill not be a.ble to get hiG load through and Jill
have to Lose th x.peD.se of the journey_ If there io a heavy police
cuard on the road, he lill be oaught and \'lill be arrested and lose his
load. The n01.'..l'lt�n ro� is ouch that he Call only take a. small load.
If i� i.B un... .:u-dod. 1e will h�ve no trouble. If it is lightly or heavily
cunrded, then he can still get through but till ha.ve to bribe the peanants
to Get hi by the .Lloe. The police havo throo alternativ�s; they can
put a. heavy GUa.:'d on the main hiB!n'�' 113a.� "the mountain route UL'1-
pr..troll elj a heavy watch on the mountain route, lea.Ving the highwa.;'
unpatroll dj 01' to oplit their fo-rces and pUI; a ligh-l; !,"tmrd. on both.
,fe C3 dicplt\1� thtl �1l!Ug�ler·s v."l.lu9s or the six possibllitico
c.c fo11e 5:
The necative number-s reprc ..ent losses and the pooitive nlJr.lbers
repres nt ,:r-Un.
Tfte polioeta preferenoes are diarnetrioal� opposed to those
of the c uggler; t�, their valuation for aD¥ outeo e is the necative
of his. We oall this type of gaoo striotly determined bocaaee , upon
exar.lination of the P93of£s, there is a d.efinite optinal choioo for th.;)
G lor 1 hleb is to tako nl 183S tho mountcrln road. \"lhile there is also
C'J'l op Ula! choioe for ,�polioe which is to guard 'both roads lig:b.tly.
Both oides call Tor· out they oan tllw<\ys enf'orce this compromise on the
other but can enforoe othing better. The s:lIuggler knows that if' he chose
tho hieh 83, tho polico l{ould try to minini210 his gain and could 5Uard it
heD;vilYj if he chece the nountains, the police ould tl�::r to miniLlize
his --;ain and ouard the mou.."ltainsj but even if they did. so, "he, orst
that could h"'ppen to him is that he lOW. bo able to t Sl all ship.uont
in aftor havinc uribud th peasant;:;.
-7-
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e polioe ar 8 th t it they deoided.. to euard tho h:1.ghv1tiW only, the
o ler ould. use th oountoins; if they ardod the mountains OJ: 11.
e ould use the higbwa.1; if they guarded both lightly, he tlould nco
tho mountains but ould only be able to get a small shipment by then,
no attar what he did.. e can illustrate theoe eooputaUons by addine
a oolumn
.
"inc the minimwn of each rOW' in the rnatri."'!, and a. row civi.ng
the n rl • of each colunm:
===�==",,===a--=l;:;
,
-5
1
5
strategy of Police
str tes:r of
srou.e ... ler
1 2 3 row 1inima
- ,, -2 5
12 2 1
2 1oofunn aJdma
The oolumn represents "the computa.tion don by the smugeler hio11 tells
hir:l. ha.t th.e .polioe auld do to him if he chose S l'ategy 1 or 2.
Tho row prooents th oomputation done by the police QA the QSswlption
ho.t the S hI r ould i;ry to maximize age:i net tach aotiorw. av
c oosi the mounta.ins, tho G ,1lQ',s1 r guarall"GOee for hi elf -th ma:zilllWll
of tho m�;n!.:I�� JJy puttine: a i.;hii g"J.a.rd on ooth roads the polioa
guarantees that the s· lor ccn never ie" more than the minimum of
his ma.x:il'Ja. Dllt.1e obcorve that hera tho
1, inimax .. !fa:ximin :: 1 14
Tho e "'lor can 8uaranteo a small trade for hir:lscl£, and tho police can
cuar �to th�t it ct�c a anOll �rada. �o m�t�Qr �hat the other side does.
A o<'.t1C • hich has the property thai; each side has a atrat:..6;Y moll resulto
in the r.U:1.1:imin. bewe cqueJ. to the minimax is said to possess a saddle­
poir.t. 15
14. Bssed.. on the !initla.x Theorem.
15. Von eumann first proved -:this.
-8-
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An eonoeuc interpreta.tion con be Given to thio value. When the
swuggler dec! 00 to ret're, the market value of his trade should bo
that amount Jlrioh yields an income ot 1 in tne samo period as it_,_
ee per trip.
Not all bacos poscoas saddle points, and in those ".hioh do
not. it is not pO::3Gible for one sid to pick a etra:t.ea whio11 guarantees
very much. or inntanc , ir.l<lg'ino that thero hod been a. G'Ol1oral OVOl'-
haulinc oS both ��ling aud polie eo CB. Tn am 1 r had
ob sin batt r tmake. and the police managed to stop bribery in the
aunt
_
00. The eff'ec)" of tIlt) oot <:r truo.1ts i6 i a� t 19 S. g .ler Call
got by a liCht police guard at the cost of some oreakases and personalstrain. Ho no· Call 0&'1'.1 a bizger loa.d bo·th on the hiITh a if in 'he
r.lountaina. Tho effect \:If the police improvement is that a strong patrolcould ca.tch tho .;ler if he were Ln the c10l1ll·toins. Tho new p�offoatrix is:
.... :s--=================- ��.==========-==== --- -_ - -- = - - :::;===-===
fltrategy of Po_ice
,
strat f3 of 1 2 3 1"0 I ainima.emue;sler
1 - 5 j 6 - 5
2 6 3 - 5 - 5
column ma.x:ima 6 3 6
T'lle ne 1 ma.trix vnlu G are sumed as above. This is the olass called
degenerate solutions. Here we ha.ve mixed stratesiee. If the �nn.1.mJlerpersi.cts in s-'-icking 'co the mountain route, he \lill be lost i if hekeeps to the highwt\Y, he 'iil! be lost. There is no longer a oimpledecision to _lleh be can oommit himself which will yield him a.
arantccd profit, even though his techniques seem to have improved
ooro than those of the police. He still haa a. profitable t�adc, ho ever,Md th re is a 18¥ for him to guaractea hil'!lSel£ a;.'l expect d profit by
follodng the actions and preoepts of most deoision-makera in cOct­
potitivc trades, and that is to tDke· a. calaula.tod risk 16. His proble:nis to decide how to oaloula.te the ri2k he should take. He is a. prudent
I!l�* and han no false illusions about the stupidity of the police.
H 10lCHiO, for instanco, that the police v1ill never split their forcec
bocaaee this lould atlount to handing him an income of three p-:lr period,
no matter ih:t happened.
16. IIortz, 13. ., "Riok Analycis in Capital Inveotment", Harvard Btlsinoss
Revici. Feb. 1964.
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Tho "",,",lor l
.
shes to caloulate uha.t is the bi - Dt expected. income
that he can arnntoo tor himoelf. rega.rdlcos of � hC1.t t 0 police tries
to do. At the very ""orst, they could find out his plans and oa.rl.mi.zo
their return, i•• minimize his return given this information. If ho
,definit ly co
.
to 11im 01- to ono action and pleys a. pure otrateer t
h a to Lose 5. 110 nn.y, hOllevor, decide not to commit himself'
clireotly but to ehooa bet reea his -hlo pur otrategios according to
some pl'obability 11 \1 ightine. e call the use of' ouch a device,
: .icn attr..ch c l"obability weightitl&'S to a. oot of pure strategies, a
m":'xed tr t eY ty uoing a. t".ixcd ctratoey ho can guarantee all
oxpoet d profit, evon if the police lore to find out his strategy_
Suppose he decidcD to toke the higlu1t\Y \ i h a pro-ba.bil�·�y of
% and the Mountains l/ith a pl'obability of :x: t where %1 + x" c: 1. Hewishes to pick these numbers in such a rnallno� thu.t he O� m8ka his ox­
pectcd l' turn, tlhich we call V J D.£I la.r(i.'e as possible under all oircuc­
stanoe • 18 If the police employed their stratogy one e.a"'ainst hic, hiD
c:zpeoted r turn lould bo: - 5% + 6::t...>. Thi.�J r:mct be ffl"octor th�, or
qual to, V. Sinilarly, for thJ other stro.tcgi<3S, 1 e can write do m
an inequality. e find that we must solve the folIo ring Det of equations
and inequalitieG:
- 5�1 + 6x2 � V
3x1 +3%2:::::'> V
6x1 - 5:1:2 ::> v
and %, + � 1;1 1
Similarly. th police nsh to make sure that no matter how shre\'1d the
Grnuegler bec�es t ey li1l be able to restrict his expected gains as
ouch as posoibl. In fact, they can m&1;:e sure that he nevo!' can get
more than xpoction of fl. Tho police decide to �'1rd. t ao hi811Wa..y \-. th
proba.bility Y1' spll:1i forces ttith proba.bility �t and guard. the mountains
Tith pro a il1t: Y.3'
• iero y1
+ Y'.2 .f- Y:\ = 1. T1'[e police nust solve the
follo iing et of equations and in�qua1!ties:
- 5.71 + 3.12 + 6Y3""::' V
6Y1 + 3Y2 - 5Y3 � v
and Y1+Y2+Y3 III 1
In linear algebra this is the dual of the primal stated earlier. So also
in linear progI"ar'..m.ng.
11. H in, L. ., "QunntitaUvo Approach to !anagcriol Deoisions". pp .. 144--134.
18. This is the point where the Neumann- �orgenstern utility thoory is
required. For n discussion of the theory, see Appendix to th· s chaptcr.
- 10-
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The genero.l mothod for tho solu�.;1on of '" ell cyst ms 0 be found in
ekins y's book 19. a. eraphioal method for this 2 x 3 game mSiY' ·00
ntod.
V
€7
-5 �I
Qr:l.:eh I
If tho first pla,yer uoc the p:i"Ob�biliti·)s of Y., and 1 - x, and if '-he
second p1n.IOI' ::CCG l...is fi-cot pt�e :::t. ::..t\".G;'r, thea tho 0:JC...)cot0d 2aJ'"Off'
for the first player ie
- 5x1 + 6 (1 ... %1) -= 6 - 1l:'t1;
Similarly, '''0 got two othor expressions if the second plf;\Ycr uses hiD
second or t!1ird pU-'"'e stratl:'\gi�s. We no r <irati a dio.t:r::,m rith tho 3 lines:
v _ 6 - 11%1; v = 3; and v = 1l.x1 - 6 repreoented ovor ",,110 int£lrvaJ.(0, 1). For � x, chos�n by the �lor he �\D BUt�entce lor himself
the r;tinimum value of the three lines at xi; thus we Dee here tha.t theoptwal ehod,o for xl is;:. Renco, his mixed I3t:ratogy uses e.;;.ch of his
pure str...tesiea rit pl'ob.sbility of t :lIld can be exprossed. nn (i. �-)
---�---
19. r ckillsey f J. C.1 Int)."oO:.tction to the Thoory of Ga.lnes t cgr:lt-l-Hil1Book COJPal\Y, No 1 York. 1952. Chapters 2 and. 3.
- 11-
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It 10 01 ar th :t tho polioe uill never use their second stratoCYi
thuD, uo need only investi.rratc"lih probability weic;hting of tho polioe
to guard the hie ley or the mountain road.. Thoir optimal strateQ.", is
( , 0, ;o:). Usin t11oGO atl�ateg.Lec, we can sec tho.t the valua of tho
Bane is V ::I .... Even iith better equip!: ant t
•
s business is nou orth
less ,han before.
It should be not�d that the use of probability in a mixed
DtratoB:'{ is a strategio use. An::! lli::r:tUro othor than an optimal one
1 aveo 0 p1 or open to d�a8v� t at he cou1� haao aVOided, regardless
of his opponentta actions.
- 12-
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AP IX TO .Cll.APTER II
THE IDEA OF IW'IONAL BEl-IAVIOOR
nrou lout our analysis, vie have made usc of the tl'wt· oual
notion tha.t the :riour of an individual oan be an..uy e. AssUlnptions
lave to bo nade about tho motiv a of the in .ividual. Ao:)ording to Von
lloumnml, tho consumer dooiroQ to obtain a ma.ximu.m of ut-ility or satisfact­
ion and tho ontrepreneur aims at a. ma.%imum of' l?rof'i'l:;lJ� 'l'hure are oQuceptuol
and p.r. otic'). diffic 11tio:::1 rhen one attecpta to describe th notion of
utility ao a. mnnboz-, Von Neumann aacumed that the a.im of all partioipants
in t, Cn110,'c :J-pl;:a ir.: mo.oy�Ihlch oholl be cUvisible, iudentionl,
au o�itutablc: ani fr 1:r trn..11Sfera.blc even in tho quant11alt,rmoonso with
uhatovcr ,-.tilfty in desi d lly each parti.cipant. In econoafc lit�rature,
i'l; in 301netimcs Clailil d ·;;ha.t dis�aiona of tho notions 0" utility and
prcfcren.e are !'Il'l;ogotn ,I' unnocesaary t cinca 1;h :'JC are purely verbal
definitiol'\s -rith no empirically observablE! conaequencea, i.e .. , ontir ly
tau�olocicul. llo-,J vert Jlihoso notions lJey not GC 1 ;;0 be ciUaUt �tiv '1;;
in:f rior to �I 11 30tr,bliGhed notions like ph.yoic£I of fOl'OO. To put it
in. ano hcr �- .", ';llile they ro.'C l.n ·t;h ir i.» edi"l.te fa. rn morel definitions,
they" 0001':1 r. �'bjact to Q[1�iri -v.l control through. the theQries 'ihidh are
bui1.1; upon th lRne 1;he ;.doa 0:: :ltili-�y or 3(l,tiDra.e�ion is roi::od.
above "ihc ot:l.tus of c til.U.t:>loQ-" by ouch ccon wio theories as m kG use of it.
T. e indiv:.clual, e, ccordillt$ to Von Neumann, Hho attomptu to obtain
theca rcspccth'13 rnax.lca. in alec 3�d to ac� "rD:tic al13". At pre 9nt
t ero io no oatiofactory tra�t�:�t of t a queGtion of rational bohaviour.
For cxaopl , thero are sovorn.l \i�C to reach -the optinu.j1 poniti011 dcpend­
inb on tho knowl()�� 311rl. understanding v1hioh tho i�ld.ividual has and upon
tho p:J.tho of Ilciion pen to hi.'"7l. :lalitd.ive ntnd;y of �l these questions
ca.y �GO imply quantitative lationships. In oxder to take into
consideration cll tho clem :r:.t::; c� the ql..a11t�tiv<l c.eocription, it Houl be
nccooa 'Y to formula" them in quantita.tive torms. This is not an eas:;
task, and GO far, it has not been euccec ...fu1. The mmn rcccon if) t�t
ouitable math netical methods have not been developed and applied to the
problem. This COes to Gh.ow tl�,..t -;1":0 oa.::dmu.rf problo�.1 need to ba fOl-:=tllatod
in n mathcQatioal • The more recent approo.oh in dealing lith
in 'viclual fS choacee iB ill tho for of illdii'i'oronce curv analysis or
ordinal analysis. This is held to be more superior in m� eys.
- 13 ...
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
f M
l y
a
)
( .. ) •
(. ) o.
( )
( )
.
) a..
( )
)
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ma
lay
a
Unfort'xnately. while this tells us that the utility of A is
c:t r than tha.t of 13, it does no"; t�ll us nOvl grC3.t this difforenoo
in tilit is. .01' cortain problems, 8•• if it io oerely a. quostion
of detcminin· which evant an individual 'trill ohoose this preOQ ts no
difficulty. On tho other hand, if any risk is involved, it is clear
thnt ,'0 MUst h�ve somo idea of the differenoe in utility between a given
pair of evonts (;)J·.d vi:. rr·or ly \vAioh one ia PI' rerred by an individual) <I
If 1 for inn·tance: a. parson lauS"� choose boot een "I:;ho event B, end a
lottery 4idh lill giv uHher iihe ev nti A or tl .. event C uith eqUa].
probabilities, and i�, moroovarf A p B p 0, *hen the 9roblem io to
determino uhethor the possibility of gain in caoe A happens) is enol:tgh
to 0 loot th risk of losN (in case C shoul� oc�ur).
If, no 1, there eris ted some cormodaty (call, perhaps. ut ilf3s )
fOl' "rhioh utilHy 1:'ere line.:.r (i.o. such thai the utilit3 ot a certain
quantity of utiles were di�ectly propor�ional to that quantity) there
roukd be no dif'fioulty. tie could simply docide the si.ze of tho si·Q&­
pcwmonts (in utiles) uhich 1110uld inwlce our pl,,\¥cr to abandone for B,
and B for Ot respectively, and then act a.ccordin..,ly. Unfortuna.tely,
lie have seen tha.t 110 commodity (not even money) behavos in this mannor,
and thus this idea is eficiellt • Y t H mey show that such a. commodity
oan be dealt ilith and oonsiderod, just so long as we do not attempt to
deal lith it as 1-!ith otler comr:locUtios which can be bou.,:.nt, oeld,
trans�crrodt or deot��ed.
A::riom (i) is aloe called the trichotomy law.
Arioms (ii) t (iii) and (iv) mean that i is an an oquivalence relations.
Axiom (v) (to'::ethor \dth Axiom (i) ) meana tha.t p is an order rela.tion.
Finally, Axioms (vi) and (vii) are sometimes deocribed by s�ing that
p io tra.1'lLlitive over i. EosontiaUy, the Axioms herp represent a.
tJeak linoer ordorine of 0 ntis, from the most desira.ble to the loast
dooirable. It is uouar "'0 6a;! that, if someone prefers tho even't A
to the ove t lit th�n the event A has more utility then B, or the
u"�ility 0' A is eater than that of B.
- 15.-
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Riol�-t dnc 10 one of the principal. caoee in whioh utiles
mey bo de t wi h s Uow, risk-takiOG depends clilsenticl.ly on the id a
of a. 10·�t ry.
Definition: Let A and B be � t�10 events, and let 0<.r <.1
Th n by rA + (1 - r) D we mean tho lottery 1'1hich has the two possible
outeo s, and B. ·th probabilities r and 1 - r, respvot!vely.
In a. similar way. lotteri B with three or mor posoible out­
comes t. a_ybc defined.. It should be pointed Qut thtlt <> lot�ery is also
an ev nt. co ination of everrsa by means of 10ttol'los obeys 1111
tho usual 1at s of �ithmotic and linear 3lgebra. rIC have tho 1'0110 lingkriOt.lBJ
(1) r (1 - rIB = (1 - r)� + rA
(2) rl + (1 .• r) .r en + 1 - s) CJ
= 1"1..... 1 - r) sB + (1 - r) (1 - s) C .
(a) r + (1 - r) A = A
Arioo (1), u. oo .. ;zl'ltrta:tivc lan, hac an obvi.ouc �canin'''. Axioms (2) c.nd(3), Jri ch r"s·"mb_s V o di�ltri'b1,rh"ro leu, ot?to th�t the la.uner in
lhich a lott y is hold dace not m.'l.ttcr: only the final probabilitiesof the pOGsible ouuconee matter.
110'1, in �he lo-�-I; ry rA + (1 - r)_e, it io clc� tl Jot it should
not m� �e -.. Ii � ... ere. 00 il' J". i3 ror _J.O(?0 b;: $0l'1 C ouch A _: c.
c havo thus tbe io�.·,
If A i C, tnon, for aD3 r( :8,{. 1" + (1 - r)B J . l rC + (1 - r)D}
If A P Ct then, for � r 0, B, l{ rA + (1 - r)B) p \ rC + 1 - r)B S_
When we oonaador- tho lottery, rA + (1 - r}D, 10m see tha.t,for I' .. 1. th lottery is idontical to the cv t ; \ hilE;i for s: "" 0,
the lotter' i", identical to 13. Non it aeeJ:lS reasonable tht.l.t a veryGIaoll chan in r ahoul.d ccace only 0. very small chQ.llgC in the utilityof the 10t� r •
(4)
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Thi , to other llith the intermediate value theorem for corrtdnuoue
r al-valued functions, gives the Axiom:
Conti uity Axio�. I.et At D, and C be events such that Ape p D.Then there data orne r f ['0, lJ such that
trj + (1 - r)D) iO
It ehe d be remarked. that, in Axiom above , we nn.:.::rt ac'iuallyhay I'f (0, 1). In fact, it r = 0 Qr 1, the lottery is equal to B or A,
re p ctiv ls-, 3l d 'Y hypthesis A � C P B, so th:l.t 0 oanna,t h :va a.
iotter,y equivalc t (un r i) to C in either of the.e two caGes. This
can be stated as a theorem.
If pCp:a, d {r + (1 - r)B} iO then 0-<'_1'<1_
t\i\Ote_.() o e.r- c- \ 'L U(\I 'hue'l'h ali S lhioh e ilave eive ore now suffioient for the
construotion of a. utility tuncbion.
-17-
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OHAPTER III
APPLIC TrONS OF 1'-SQ-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES
1. sinees ProblemD
Th type of problem to hich this theory has & dir ct a.pp�ica'Uon
is ono 'lhioh has some of the aspeots of a duel. A duel hew tho property
that the goals of the opponents are diametrically opposed. In � market
in hiob thn si ce of t·o (. mon s. ore or less fixed by t.lO governmont
or by habi to f the extra customers tha.t one firm can a.ttra.ct must have
beon loot by anothor fir�. The firrro are i� ure op o�itio
.
ncb 8.20citua.tion. �t one ��inst the other loses. An advertiSing oampaign
in n marl.: t for petrolOUtI produots . ey e of' -!ihis nature , A highly
simplified example of our local envirol1l':\ont mey be 01 ted. Charlo'" and
Cooper have written a more det�tled papor or. this topic.21
1'1 0 oil companies t Sholl and Uobil t each have a. millioI}, dollars
to spend on advertising their produots in a certain rno.rket area. They
can use the media of radio, t levision, nowspaper£l, magazines and bill­
boards. For simplioity, they can be grou.ped in'�o ro.o.io, television, and
printed Lledia. The marketin research Gections of each firm liork out the
expected off ct of a!1y conting€mcy. \ie will ddscuaa 1:11e decision-making
a.t She1 company only. A pa.Yoff mat ....ix of 4 x 4 is drawn up. Jl1� con­t3ins inforf.lation on t e 16 co ti�noios i; at mi.,zht arise 11.' ' rcom­
pany spent all it ... money adve -tieing 0101y -oy nocno of rc.dio, �lev1oion,
or print:)d media., or d cd.ded to save the million dollarF3 and not
a.dv.,.rti� at all. Booh cIltry in the P83oi'f matrix :ropreoents the
amount of extra revenue abov� cost e�timated under these oircWlstanoes
(in million of dollars) for Shell.
20. For details and models,
sec "Game Theory Models in the Alloca.tion of Advertising Expondi turett t
Operations Researoh Vol. 6, No.5, 1958, (pp. 699-709).
21. Cha.rnOB and Copper., ibid.
- 18-
Un
ive
rs
ty 
of 
Ma
lay
a
QOBIt
0 TItV.
0 0 -0.:; 0 2.;
:.1:.v. 2 0 1 .., 5
ffiiELL 1 ., 0 3 .. 5
-2 -3 0
.... ,,_
e
••".. -1__••• �...-
+1 0 n I L
Pro�rtm 1 Program 2 Pro :r�J 3
Pro 1 2 4 -2
5\.\�\...\- 2 2 -2
Pro 3 -2 --2 3
ietio examplo i8
sua involViu
. d1 en.'lt
Consider oa.cll oom"UZ'J"V
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ma
lay
a
x . ..> 0
1 -
Tho probl for ell Cor.Ipaey- is to find three numbors, %1' �t x3:ch t at
2%1 + 4%2 - 2x3 > V
4x1 + � - 2%3 ::;:::.. V
-2z1-�+3x3>V
here tho
This OXD.mpl haa solution of %1 = t, %2 = if x3 III 2 t and V = u. �oint rprotations can be given to the�"_ ThGY can be
r € od aD p obabilitiec which should be attached� the decision to
adopt any speoific program. Or, if it io possible to spend varying
urns on th programs (with roughly oonstant returns) , then xi g:ivelntom :tion as to ho Shell Company should split up ito adv rtising
bud€ t b t roon the thr 0 different progrruns. It Should spend 250 ,000
on each c pro ama 1 and 2 and 500,000 on pro€,"raID 3.
An incomplete expenditure in each program might reoul t in
poor r outoom s in m trix and the W 101e coni'igllI'ation 0 change. Th
more satisfactory 1fJ¥ to treat tho advertising problem is as one of a
eries of �am s b ing playod eery pG?iod. arnes and Cooper s �5est
this approach in their analysio of Constr ined Games" in their article
noted e<lrlier. Leonard Gill an 22 of Uacsachusetts lusti tute of Technoloe;y
has also itten an 1oi01c 0 advertising oompetition. In this artiole,
he introduoos the ooncepts of susceptibility and rosistanoe funotions
as u ed in his mathema.tioal odel to determine the strate and spendi.ne;
rates of the partioipants in the adver"ti,sing oampaign.
Competition botween tl 0 refineries tllaring a market uith
re1ati fixed demand has been s at up and treated as a two-person zero­
oum game by G .. H. Symondo23 in his examina.tion of game thoory uses in
problems of ot oleuc refining.
22. Leonard Gi1lm ,Opera.tions Analysis and. the Theory of Games,
Ar.lcricM Statistioal Aosooiation Journal, 1950 pp. 541-545.
23 S�onds, G. H., "App1io tiona to Industrial Problems", (a.bstract),
Boono otrica, 22, 1954, p. 526.
-20-
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24. Gale, D., Kuhn, and TuCker, A. W.. "Linear Programmill8 and the
Theory of Gamos", in Koopmans, ed., Aotivity Analysis of' Pro­
duotion and Allocation, John Wiley & ions, Ino. • Y. 1951.
25. Von roumann, "1 Certain Zero-sum Two-Person Game Equivalent to
tho Optimal Aosigi3mont ProbloT.lt It in Kuhn and Tuckor, od.,
Contributions to the 'l'heory or Oaxnes, Vol. II, Prinoeton
University Press, Prinoeton. 1953. pp. 5 - 12.
Considerable \fork has been done in the applioation of the
game theory ot "duels" to problem of weapons evaJ.uation 'for taotioal
�e ons. These applioationa are ot core intorest to those whose
soope io oonfined to opera.tions research. .tuob of th \lor: in this
are 1 olaaDified. Searoh theory has t hOl-leVer, be n applied to
marketing.
Gale, Kuhn, and Tuokcr24 have discussed the matheDatical
analogy that existo bet eon the solution of a linear p:togratl and. tho
oolu ion 0 to-person zero-sum game. It is al\f�S possible to
formulate such a game from a linear program in such a. manner that the
solution of this am omounts to a solution ()f the linear program.
Assuming e arc faoed with a problem of.�illingin jobs tnth
���ple. FUrther sume we have an valuBiGion (\ \ \ \thioh tells the
�'\.of ]he i th person doing the j th job. The Qj:St1mal ignment
problem25 concezna itsolf' with th d.i ·tribution of personnel in a.
maximoJ. ms.nn r. Thore is such a rela.ted game l'lhore solu"tion Biven us
a. solution of' this problem. The difficulty in this a.pplioation comen
in the eval tion of he sui" hility of the attributeD of Vo.riOUD
indi"ltiduals in the perforoanco of' difference taskD. this method has
boen used to limtod erlend by the Army.
There ha.ve boen situations in Thioh sampling or gather extra
inf'orma.tion costs money, yo outs do m on the possibility of caking So
1rOng c1ocision which CE\iY. in itself, be very costly, lead to the fo1'­
mulation of statistical games. In essenoe, the probleo amounts to
l orking out how much one should be willing to p� for informAtion,
tho value of hich will not be 1o.10wn until it is obtained..
- 21-
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lion-eo-operativo, non-aero-sum
int roswine fe tures;
aQ possess a nucbcr of
o t "0 a.: i .portent exampl froQ industry t is tho design of a.dcci ion proc a to be folIo d in sequential sampling of a batchof od.o tlhor the co t of sampli is high and the loas inau.r:red
'Y endi out a batch uith aboV' a oertain numbor of defectiveit at. 26
2.
ho ore int renting problema of competition arc not
zero-rnun. The ods of a oup of lor firma in a f.Jarket are not
nece :Jarily dirun tric 11' cppcned , Thoro tl� bo room for all if insteadof fightin ... 0 themselves they fol10\1 a policy of live and lei liv •A period of cut-throat competition might hitr:b all of thQ[:l. fil<m pureopposition of int rats is no longer the case; t e computations of thetl-lo-porson zero-s arne theory no loneor apply. Unfort'Wlately t thetheory is in a f 1 6S 0 ti �tory s ate outside the area of thotuo-person eer-o-sum arne. In tho literature, non-zero sum games aredivided into co-operative and non-eo-operative games depending onheth r collusion do s or- dOCE! not occur.
In the eo-opcrntiV'C ease27 the game thoorists have tendedto areue t lat t pI z-c ill b SU£ficic.ntly rationul to discover andmake 1 UDe of all 0 porttmi tios rlhioh can be ntutuclly advantages.The.t is, th pI oro e.r tcl::on to co-oper lie on aoy d every etionwhi e � inc. aBC the p�off of either pl�er (provided it does not,a.t th ane ti.rle, reduco the p::woff of the othor). In the terminologyof the no classical economist. they Till al fa:! end up some\'lhere onthe co tract curve.
It is however doubtful whether pl�ors are real� so rationalin practioe. Further, there are problems involved in arrivin(£ at anace pt ble division of t PaQoff tfhioh miB'ht prevent pleyers frommaximising th ir total loot as this rationality assumption r �res.It m� be not d that most of the novelty in the co-opar tivc casealysi oocurs in investigation of tho diviSion of the spoils betweenoolluding pI rs.
26. Bl 1 11, D., d Gil' 0 J ••• eory of G 13 and tatisticalDeciSions, ew York: John iloy . Sons, Ino., 1954.
27. Seo R. Am , '. Surv y of Co-oper tive Games Without Side Payments".athom tical Economics ot OokUr Morgenstern, pp. 3-24.
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(I) xistence of neveral equilibrium pairs of strategies in
a GaIne does not mean that 1 the.v will all yield the Game p�off. For 1oxempl" if (a., b) and (a , b ) ar oqui1ibrium pairs, neither (a, b )
nor (a , b) need be equilibrium pairs. This m� oontribute to the
oomplioa-ion of the planning problems of both pl�ers inca both m�
10 out i th Y do not ai. for tho e e eq ilibri air.
(2) In the zero-suo caee , seereoy in planninE; is an advantage;
in t.o no�zcro sum case, it rill often p� a player to rev al his
plano.
mittin
his disclosure maybe used as a threat or a me�s for trans­
information hioh permits a degree of tacit collusion;
(a) Thr at information: To a player who announce�that he
will drop a bomb whioh will blow everyone up if he
does not have hia way, disclosure of this info�nation
is necessary for him to t in his point. any eoonomic
examples such as strike :threats, mB¥ be cited. 28
(b) Informetion for quasi-collusion: For oxam let a
comp� m� publicize any price inoroas s in the
hope tha.t this move will soon be follo ed by
other firms in the industry, to their tua1
a vent •
(3) another te�Vure of hhe non-cooperative non-zera-sum case is
that both pl�ers will often ,be led by self-interest to take deoisions
zhf.ch arc mutually disadvantages. This has been illustrat d by 0. game
called the prisoners' dilemma. 'fhich is a.ttributed. to A. U. Tucker.
Two prisoners are broug t in and interrogat d separately. ·'a.ch knowo
they ill both get off if noi thor prisoner "talks'·. HOlrever they are
both told tha.t i one confesses and the other do D not, the one who
fails to confess ill roceive a particularly heavy penalty. In this
case both plcyors ma.1 \1ell decide to proteot themselven by confessing.
This point is of considerable eoonomic importance. It
reveals by oitizens m not contribute taxes voluntarily even though
each tiants the government to function - the citizen sees nothine to be
gainud uy p�iI16 taxes unless there is some guarantee that o'Ghers ill
contribute too, just as one prisoner will confess unless �e haa some
aasurance that his .fellow prisonor will do so. SiuilarlYt ma.tl3"
storekeepers will keep their shops open on Sunday although they all
prefer a holia.a_y, each fearing that if he does not do so he \n11 lose
customers to his competitors. This argument is involved in the loGicbohind conscription and ra.tioning in artime t aovcrn::tent measures to
coobat inflation, etc.
28. For a hi y SUSb�stive analysis of this and othor related problems,
see T. C. Schelling, The strategy of Conflict, Harvard UniversityPress, C bri • :1800. t 1960.
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Nash 30 hao provl;:d that overy non-cooperative game in tlhioh
each plo.vor hao only a limited numbor of ctratcgic alterna.tive open to
hic h a; 1 ast on (r.. ixcd or pura strategy) equilibrium point. '1'0
put it i another I there nota at least one combination of mixed
or pur strat
.
ee (a, b, 0t ••• n) such th:l.t if they are Illployod by
pleycrs (A, B, C,. • r) rcopoctively, it \dll be unprofitable :for aJX3
one of' '�h De pl�r to switch to a.n;y other strategy_ Thus, if all
pI oro one 0 10 this p ttcrn th <:lolf-int rent of tIl· renaining
player , GO lead ham to (it!
- to the equilibrium po.tt rll.
Th
�. ffioultiee {hioh arise in n-porson game are similer
to the we-per on, non-aoro-eum eaao , Different equilibriuo points
[ ey yiold ';ff I' nt p<\yoffs to the pl�Qrst and if some pleyerc aim
ror one
.
librium point and tho r maining pl�orfJ aim for another,
they m all end up at a nOI -equilibrium point. ThUG, an n-pez-son
gam mey pOSDOSS moro than one equilibrium point. In the absenoe
of co-ordination of the p�ann, if ther are a number of oquilibrium
poin rs , the .. ley-ors m:;w find it difficult to attain o:ny one of them.­
cycling.
.. 25-
\. In co-oper-ativa go.oes t ho 'leV'�r, VIC find that a nOli' idea
app are: that of coalition. In bhe n-peraon caoe, there are pOG�ible
coaliti ns and this mocas that t if Zl coclition is to foro an . remain
for Gome ti e, the 'i trent membyro of the coalition must roac. �oo
sorh 0 eq ili'rium or stability. Thus, for an n-p rson eamc, "1e
shall 1 t II a ( 1, 2, ••• t n) bo the set of all plQ3ers. Any ncn-.
emp y sub ...ot of n i1 eluding 1 itaolf and all ·the one-element subsets)
is called a coalition. A gamo of the rela ively uninteresting V'Q.riety
in hich ho;t'e is no otivation for coalition formation is called an
inc.ooenti orne, aa contrustcd with cosential gameo in \ hich ito
raenberc can beno 'it f�om the fOl'•• a Lon of a coalition.. Thus, a
&arne v is es entia.! if
It is in es n"ial otho;r.;ise. It is tho o ..oontial games '\ hioh are of
intereot to uo.
30. If h, ''Non-Coopere.tive Games", Almals of Iathematics 54(1951),
pp. 2 295.
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2. In order �or a coalition to uaximize its returns, it m�be necessary tor momb l' to undergo some sacrifice, For example, a.
c tel may flnd it profitable to clooe the inefficient plant of one
of ito nemb rs r ther than ttin� every member to reduce his scale
of oper tiona. In this case, in order to induoe the sllort-changed.individual to corvo the intereots of tho coalition it is necessaryto set up an eqUalization pC\Yffient (bribe) for h.im. In game theoryouch rodivioion of the apoilts i.:l cal.Led a aide-plcy11lent.
3.
.
pu atio for t e -person g 0 Via vector
x - (x1, ••• n) satisfying:
� x. = v (s)
iE:r-r
.1.
xi > v( \ i) ) for all iE. N
4. But 0 deoe one dcturnine how much \,1i11 be paid to each
plcyor in diff rent circumstances? Given the coalition whioh ere
forced, hat p�offs ·11 be reoeived by the members of each oo31ition?
Von Neumann and Mor llstern pproaohtld this question by describing101er li.it to 10 0 .oulltS. By tho characteri tio function of an
n -percon b�C e me a roal-valued function, v, defined on tho
oubscta of IT t hich assigna to each SeN the ma.:ximwn value (to s)
o the tuo-porson g.:::JOe played bet reen S and N-S, assuming that these
t10 coalitions form. Thus, v (5) is the amount of utility that the
tlcr:1bors of 5 con obtain from tho game, whatever the remai ine pieyers
ney do. TIlt s , it follot'lG tha.t
(i)
(ii)
v (�) = 0
NO"1 if i.Uld T:n' joint co31itions, ue have the supo::t'-'oadditivity property:
v (5 U T) > v 5) + v (T) if Sf\ T ::: 16
Thus, by an n-person Er-.ne in chara.cteristic funotion form is oeant a
rcal-valued function v, defined on the ouboets Qf U, satia£ying the
above tuo conditions.
5. Lot x and y be two imputa.tions and lot S be a coalition.
e sey x do· teG Y' through (notation, % f- sy)
i) %i>li for all i� S
ii) � x. :=. v(s)
•
L! l.:I." tJ
- 26-
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e Bey X do inateo
S such th t xf-.
S all pr\o;f r x to ;
obtaini t x &"1
(notation, xt-Y) if there is any coalition
Thut: condition (i) s'b tos that the combers of
condition (i1) statcs tha.t they are ca.pable of
s h ••
6. 0 a t of all undo inat d i put �ionB for a. game,Y, is
called. th cor. The not tion for 'the cor is c (v).
ThUB the core of a ua�ef Vt is the Bet of all n-voctors, x,
satifJi'yin
(a) � xi:::: v (0) fer all SC N
ES
(b) t!E.
i€ s
x. = v ( )
1
7. ;;)01 ion. on N umann definod e. solution of an n-perccn
C <'I a s t of imp tl:\tion ., nc + has t ie follo'line oho.ractoriat1ca.
(i) If F and G are &cy" two of the imput!..."tio._s in a. olution,
tnon neithor:r dOJ:unat . G nor G do. inat�s F.
(ii) If I io an imputa.tion \ hioh is not inoluded in tho
solution aet, then thero is at lea�t ono imputation,
1*, hich dominates I d uhich is inalud d in the
so ution. un, a. solution consist 0 a Bet of
imputations none of tvhioh dooinatec a:ny othor, and
hich ann amon£; them doninato a.ny c:rcluded impuiation.
- 21-
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2.
(i)
-or a ma.rkotin situ tion. mathema.tical rno ole oro develop d
expr B in ion betw on net revenue or not returnc d the
vari hlos t t affect it. Here we will deal with multico� titors
(i.e. n-co pe�itor) d di c G four models when the market potential
is ina. p na nt of bot 1 price nnd promotional effort and wI nit is
de en ent on oither or both of the controllable vcu-iablos.
In a co potitive Horld, sales of od and s rvices depend
uccn r.l • f eta s, like ity, pack 'ng, price! promotion, distributionc annalo, co it'on, and " ketin� strat gia.3 Of these variables
Gome ere wldar 0 0'0 control, some are under the control of competitors,
and other� are exo noua variables suoh co pcpul�tion and national
Lncone , I.e s as' ha.t to increase ac.les oluoet ono can either
decr(;'a.De price or 1. cr-ease promotional efforts. I� }lcther ouch a.
strategy io orth pur uing or not dopen not only on the comp tit�rs'
strategies, bu 0 on '�he characteristics of tho market.
ac co p titor mani 1 tea his controllablo v riables so as
to caxiniz hi objective i'unctio Here, under 'tile asoumption stated
belon, o can do� lop :fbur I!13,th'.?matical ode.Ie « xprcssiue :b e rab.tion
bet een net r venue d th vaxi ble v at air ct i�. The ossumptions
under1yine these I odels are:
1. Thero � competitors 11, X2' ••• , � and each competitorhat 0 controllable v iablest viz., price and promotional effort •
• "an f cturi - cost of each competitor is Uirt::ctly pr-opor-tLonal,
to he p.oduc .. io quantity and ....eh co, otitor knows monufa.cturing'
C03tS 0 �l oth r co.petitors.
2
Tho e octiven S 0 pro otio
for different competitors.
4. �nch cocpotitorts share of market depends on his relativ�
effectiv • romotional effort and tho differenoe bet Teen his price
pric of all other competitors.
5. Collusion is not por itted and each compe itor tries to
maximize his net revenue or P03off'.
offo t per do 1 is different
31. :aCartb.Y, ic lOOtin: A an ,riel Approach, Romcuood, III:
R. D. Irwin, 3rd ed., 1968.
- 28-
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f M
ala
ya
c:::::; i ;::
..-:::::.. i = 1
�otol oorkct potential represents total sales of all
oompetitors und r a uivcn set of otrat gies. In general the ark tpotential i a function of price and promotional offor s of all com­
peti tor� an eu 1 xogcneoua variabloa <::.S population, national mcone tetc.
Tho contri� tion of prot�tional y,ffofit to the �ket aharaof' xj is proportional to (oL jElj)O /1::2: i : 1 �i 5i)0 n·r<) Si iothe expenditure on promotione� vr:ort,�= I-is the effootivenes of
nro otionol effort per dollar of Xi, and oi is a positive oonstanti - 1, 2, ••• , n ,
The oontribution of price to the share of ma.rket of Xj isaasuned 0 be kj (pj - pj) �'lh9re pj is the price cherged by Xj andpj is tho av r' price of all other competitors. 32
'F-10U�:" _-j 4133 C different for different oompetitors. in o...traseunpt Ion, it is aasumed tha.t all kj's are the sarne. and the commonvalue 10 denot d by_k. Thus the contribution of pl'ice to Xj'soa.rket cliar-e is k(Jlj - pj).
The ��ality of product, distribution ch��cls, and otherfaotors t let in£luenoo sales are assumed to be fixed for each corapotdtor.The contribution of all these factors is denoted by a oon3tont vj forXj. Thus, t:l share of market} j of Xj is Given by
j j = vj + u(�j Sj)ej / L � : � CoL i ss ) oi +
:I(n - 1) ( � : � pi - upj ),,,11 re 'll� is a poc':i;ive constant such that
Thus, } i t o r.mst be botueon 0 and 1 for all values of pi end Si.
32. If p is aver price of all the n-coopetitors then the contributionof prioe to th shar-e of rum-kat can also be 111'i -ttcn aa
k .1 (- .) ,.1 T(1/ ) c:::::;:- i = n . . 7J P - PJ = .r:J L n L i = 1 Pl. - PJ.J
kj 11 {1/n):2:" i.1j pi - L(n - l}/nJ =l
= kj1.t(n - l)/nJ Ll/(n - 1) � i#j pi - pU
= kj �j - pj) wh re Pj = kj1(n - l}/n.
-29-
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Each eompetitor has infinite number of strategies. It is
aaeumed that each compotitor is fully al"lara of the objective f\m.otiono
of all 0 her 0 mpetitors and their strategies. Also, gain for one
competitor do s not neoessarily mean loss for any othor competitor.It is possible for all eo�petitors to inerease (or deoreaso) their
l}rof'i t:1 at tho s e time. Thus the problem of marlmizing the. profi"bs
of n-competitors is an n-porson no�zero GUm game. thus, in some
pmieul cases, e<"lUilibrillr.l solutiono are obtained under the assump­
�iona statod earlier.
-30-
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FORJIDLATIOrl OF THE FROllLEJl.i
o p off (not revenue) for Xj is given by
P�off = (tot volume of sal s) x (Profit rna.rein) - (promotional xp:mdi turo)
. � Afjmj
- Sj '£2i I: n *331. • 1 S1>0,J = 0 1. ==
if S1 .,. S2 == 83 ••• == Sn = 0,
here, for Xj,
Rj = n t revenue
A::: 2I'.:et pot .1·l;ial .hioh is a. fu lct' on of price and
promotioual of_arts of all competitors,
; j - vj ;. uxj + k/(n - 1)
r
"2 i : � pi - npj),
pj = prico,
sj = 0 �enditure on promotional effort
xj ::: (� j Sj)ej / 2:. � : � (0{. i 5i)ei t
oj = pj - oj = maI\",in of prof'it
oj = ulliJ� coot of production,
oi,ol i, Vi, u , and k are a.ll constants and
�i.==n1 Vi + u == 1J.
*33. -=;
i """ n
L. i = 1
Si>0 implies that a.t leo.ot one oompetitor spends
on promotional effort.
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It io aaeumed that produotion is equal to sales of a1l3
ooopetitor. Th problem is to find eqtrllibrirun pOints (p*, 6 )
for C ch com ti to in the s n 0 that if aJ.lY oompetitor doviat o
fro.. the o 'librium v uon t his j)a;Joff 6000 dotm , The oquilibrium
v� co of pj and oj are obtained by maximizi:'lg pa;roff for Xj
s bj ot to th con traints th<!t ''oj � 0 and n j? O.
Assuming the a. ove relation Dotl'leen peyoff and variables
a:f'feotin"" it, the follo\1in four models are discussod.
{a} 0 e1 I: A is independent of prioe ond promotional offort.
) :0 e1 "'1: drJ.cnda Oll pr notional effort only.
(0) .0 el !_I: - eponds on price On1$6
() odol IV: depends on both prico and pronotional effort.
- 32-
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l.) Sj::::> I
(ii) Sj 0:: 0; <:"
i ;:: n
Si� 0"'::::;'i=l /'
SOWTIONS OF THE 10l)ELS
(a) -odel I: r c1; Potential Is Independent of Pl'ice and Prol'lotional
Effort •
• plying Tuc. r conditions, th r.m.ximum v....lue Qf Rj
subjeot to Sj � 0 io obtained from the follo i eque.tiona.34
a j/'d pj 0,
dR.'!;; sj � 0, (1)
.:»jo Rj / a sj ;:: o.
Ii' Sj� 0, hen � j/ goj ;;: o. 3quation (1) is oolved tOl" the follolling
e "'ell.
a j /0 J; j :::; 0 g:ivee 2)
} j := lZlj :: vj + uxj + Lk/(n - l)J (� i : � pi - npj)
a j 1& sj -= 0 eives Sd::: !'\r.ljuejxj (1 - xj) (3)
So_yin equations (2) and (3) for j - 1,2, ••• J n t.c solutions
cor� os onding to Sj,,;::> 0 an T.lj? 0 are givon by as-i;erisl\a d nato
these val.ucs ) :
�
i = n .
-
1 Pl.'J. :::;
<:::"i=n I� �i = 1 Ci + 1 k,
j� + f:{n - 1) (vj + UXjit) + 1 +).jJ/ 1�(2n - 1)
h "'l' = k ( � � = nl Ci - nCJ-)'w era �J �l. = •
(1 - Jej*),
'l
j* = �j - sj*.
1her Sj 0 an Z�: � 5i.:> 0, t len
j <= ALvj + ·4(n - 1) ( � � : � pi - npj)J oj,
- 33-
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� so A L(Vi + u i + k/ (n - 1) ( � w : � pw - npi)Jru. - S1
when (i # j)
By differentiatinc Rj and Hi with respect to the respuotive controllable
varinbl a and simplifyil'lg the solutions correspondine to Sj := 0 ;lne
Given by * denote the3e solutions):
mj·* = L(n - 1) vj + 1 +AjJ / k(2n - 1'),
mi*' 101 L D - 1Hvi + uxi**} + 1 +7\.iJ / k(2n - 1),
5i*"'. ,.. Aueini** xi** (1 - xi** ) •
Rj�� Q 2j** - Bi��.
R· *� (\��.
F* C'.)f-)(o, -:::. '1 1M � - �I
I. 81 = 2 ••••• a Sn - 0, then the p�off for oach oocpetitor is zero.
fa.:-tioc.lar Case whon oL 1 ::2 oL 2 .... .,. c;J... n and e1 lOW 02 "" •••• en :: 1
Tho pU;;'ofr fer Yj is
Rj;; Lvj + UBi/2i : � s' + k I(n - 1)
( � i r.. ')J' C!'L . , pI. - npJ 14J - "',).l. = _
If Sj;:> 0 thon Rj is ma.:rimv.1n "Then
(4)
sj* = .1' ••j*" (1 - xj*).
If Sj "II 0 and � � : � Si::> 0, then Rj is mc..rimurn uhen
nj** = J:(�1 - 1) vj + 1 ... 7t- jJ jlf (211 - 1). (5)
34.. The set of equ iiions given by (1) is also sufficient for mariClUlp
llj if Rj is a. concave function. 10\01 Hj ia cone ve if
ra2 j I 0 pj2 t ?/"Rj I'd pj as9J' is neSD.tive;J j / a pjd Sj, a2Rj Ia 2Sj2, definite
- 34·-
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The oquilibrium values are obtained froll (4) and (5) by
the procedure givon below.
he proQcllu.rc consisto of findincr cquilibriu.'"!l val.uca for
two corn letitor j5 and erleu ine :. t to ll-conpetitors cucceeeavcly.
In the follouin procedure, it is aacumed that t = 2, thooe exist
S1
. and 52 that oatiot:,' e uat Ion (4).
In tho c e of tuo conpcti tor" a.t each stUu<?O it has been
tested ,'het} or t o incomin.., cO'Jpetitor can profit more by spencl.ino
on promotional effort. 10 oan do 00 siQilarly in thin c�e.
(1) clabel tho cornpotitor 60 that
(n - 1)v1 + 1\.1 > (n - 1)i12 + A 2 � ••••
> (n - 1) \�1l�1l
(2) Find an in·tial (S1*: S2*' ••• , St*' 0, 0, ••. ,0) where
repro eDt 11, m, :11)=\1' of c 1Dot�tors \lho spend on
promotional effort and S.+:; v satisfy equation (4)
Initially t = 2. 1
(3) If t< n , test whether .tu/k(2n - 1)
r() � J c::::::-i=tL n - 1 vt + 1 + /It + �" > ;::::::._ i = 1 5V;
(4) If yos, go to Dtcp (2) �ld replace t by (t + 1).
(5) If no, (u1*t 82*, ••• , St*t 0, •••0) ia the equilibriumsolution.
35. For detailed discussions on tic existenoo of 0 ilibrium solutions
for "he 0 C of � 10 competdtors t seo J Ghiv , GJ.pta, ":o.thematioulGamo !odo1 .. or a. Duopoliotic .lSl'kot", hanagOtilOnt 3ciencc. 13,568-583 (1967).
- 35-
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(b) ad 1 II: otal' at Potontiol 10 a. Function of Promotional
Effort Only.
I_ '�hi6 .100.01, the total I Il.rket potential is a. function of
tot 0 fee uivo pro ot':onaJ,. efI'orto .. of al.I competitors and it:
indo )ondent of pr-i.ceu, If �;: 5'" :: : � -L.; S. l'1hore rL�i5i isthe effectiv prOIlotional ei'fort-m:J.XI, ·t�n iha tota1 market
potential, A, is fUnotion of 2 and is independent of prices.
once, OA/(Jpj=O
CJ A /c9 Sj == oL j dA / dz
If J 1.0 a concave ft ction of pj and 5j, then tho K:uhn-Tuckor
condition '11 «iva naxlmum vcluo of Rj f'or a Given sct of values
of pi and 5i (i 1/ j)
The concavt t,,- of Rj Hill depend u ion the f'unc'tdonal, foro of A.U!
If Sj..:::> 0 and mj;:::.O, the .c....":i:::uo value of Rj i'" given by.
d Rj I g pj ;: 0,
8Rj / d Sj ;: O.
If Sj ;: ° L � ;: � Si> ° and mj'::::::>O, thon the narlmun Rj io
given by
Gj == 0
If 51 ;: S2 :: ••• :: Sn ;: 0, .ho ot z-ovemic Rj :;: O.
Lot A :: a ["1 - .kp ( - '3z)J trher-c a and Y arc pooitive constnntst
the solutions art: follm-1S:
If Sj:::> 0, oj ;> 0 the rl.:l..Ur:m.rn val.ne of Rj ].0 obtained for:
• If Rj is co. cave, Kuhn-Tucker con'; tionc 1 ad to !.1�:ir.ru.r. value
of: .j. In all oubcoqucrrb diGcu;:;sioilli, it is a.sGu.7,e� tIl t
Xuhn-Tucker conditiono lead to naxinmm vulue of Rj.
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(8)
j* • L(n - l)(vj +
,j" 'l'1j j (1-
j) 1 + AU /1;(211 .. 1),
*) + j2*0<.. :t¥ ( --- )
� nN 0 l' 01£.....
'
= 1
u > XiI 1J::> J . to ......
for
0)
In is. del t e tot;_U. ot potc!1ti <'I ""::... r.d! !l 0
ri • . /" S� .: 0 ;('01' j., 1;�" • �, :r..
'hen
i:::> 0 .�d .j;> Of ii' on l' 'r..TJlm v.;J;uc Qf
d l
' / C)' "" 0 (7)
- £: - 2:
i : - pi J
:. na (G, (. ) simplify tolloMU
"j :>
mj* - ( ... jolt) £Vj + u.."tj* + I(n - 1)
- rr-
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Por j - 1, 2, ••• , n equations (8) and (9) roprosont 2n�equa.tioilS
involving 2n unknovms , and honce the values of pj and Sj for
j - 1, 2, ••• , n can be ob�aincd.
If Sj = 0 :tE!: � Si.::> 0 and mj ::::=0- 0 then
oj** ::0 (A - jojH') Lvj ..,. k/(n - 1)
:x: ( L � ... � Pitt - npj�·*)J / �\k (10)
(j � 1, 2, ••• , n)
Equations (10) gives n oqua.tiona involvina n unknctrna Md honea they
can be solved simultanoously. Tho equilibrium solutions oan be
obtained by comparing the profits in the two situationn.
(d) .odel IV: Total Market Potential Is a. Function Dr :Both Prioe
And Promotional Effort.
In this model tho total tl<:U'1::ot potential is a function of
both pric and pro�otioncl offortn of all competitors. The equilibrium
solutions of Xj are obtained, as before, by oomparing maximwn peyoff
hen Sj;::;' 0 rith tha.t llhen Sj == 0
L�t A = a LIZ � : � uipiJ L1 ...;y..p ( - flz)..1,
"t. erc
pi - pric che..l"SCd by Xi t
Z - <;:
i == n bU Si) �- c:::::.. i == 1
and at 'i, '" are oonstants. Ii' Sj:::- 0 and oj > 0t the raa.ximum
value of Rj is obtained Then:
(1 - jmj* - -:E.:.! : � l ipi*) {"vj ... uxj* + k/ (n - 1)
x ( c::::::
i - 11 , )I- '.) J� i == 1 p:l.: - npJ
.... kmj* (1 -�! : � \npi*),
- 38-
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(11 - �j:nj �)J j'" =: Akmj�(.
(j = 1, 2, ••• f n) (12)
Sj* = 0.( 1 - �i :
+ 'jd- jSj* Jt p( -'} z
L uipi*) tlj* Luejxj*(l - xjlt)
>f j *_7. (j = 1, 2, •• ·t n) (11)
If Sj = 6, :2__ � : � Si.::;:;. 0 and mj ::::> 0, then the
r:l ximwn value of Rj io obbzrined yolhen
E:I1la:tion (11) �iv n a sci; of' 2n e 'aiio involving 2n unknownc and
equation 12) 3ivwo a sct or n e. atio s ll.volv"ng n nnkncunc ,
Hence these equationn C311 be oo17ec. ro'!' the unknosns , ltt CO'1ll).:u-ing
t 1e :rr·ofita t tho ecru iLi.br..it:1 ol:Y{'ion OQ be fund.
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E'. -= 1,000, Y = 0.001, 1 "" "112 = 0.005·
Nyroorioal Example:
Example: The followil1B num rical example cives the equili rium
solutions for th fOUl' models oonsidered.
n "" 2, 01 a SOt °2'" 51, cc: 1 "" d. 2 "" 1, e1 = 02 '" 1,
V1 "" v2 = 0, u = 1, k = 0.1
lodel I: A "" 1,000,
odel II: A = sf1 - eJtP\ -� (0(.181 + oL 2 s2>}-1,
a - 1,000 :J • 0.001
Modol III: A = a £1 - W'1P1 - w2 p';;,
a = 1,000, 11 :I
.
2
::; 0.005
Model IV: A � '" £1 - exp { -1 <.1..,8, +0<..252 l} J
x (1 - w1P1 - 2P2)'
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1
a 0 82 >- 0,
.. ( .1 I 0.).
2* p (1. ) I 0.3.
01 > 0 02 O.
(2.1) f .3
(0.9) / .3,
o.
-.
1
• (1.1 + .., ) / • J
) I 0.3,
2" (1 - �*) - (0,.
) IOc
*) 10.
1
'" { -_ +
o.
} 0 e I+
o.
+
. .:A..I...,.... )
0.00 )J:! (1.. ) D *
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odel III: (1000 - 5(pt* + P2*) - 5m1*J LIOx1* + P2* - P1*J
= �lOOO - 5(P1 + P2*)_7m,*f
/5.000 - 5(P1* + P2*) - 5m'2_*J LIOx2* + :91* - P,jl
=< Ll000 - 5(p* + p *) J m *,
<:.. 2
1;l1·jf 1 - x1*) 0: m2:!- 1 - :'2*) '"" 01;{- + 62*) / 1000.
10 cl Iy: 3p ;c,2 - 2p * (250 + lOx *) + 500(20 +- x *)111 1
+ (200 - P2*) (lOx1* + 1'2*) = 0:
3P...,*2 - 2p...,*(251 + lOx2,') + 510 (20 + �*)z, .... e;
+ (200 - :p 1*) ( 10_:2i(. + P 1 -) -,; 0,
exp £- 0.001' (31* + G2*)J £ 10:-:1')(' + P2* - P1*} /
10,000 - x2, / (131* + S2*) J
+ � / (0,* + S2-l{·) ;;;; 1/5(1'1* .... 50) (200 - P1* P2*)'
c:tp £- 0.001 (S{ -I- 02*}J LIOx./, + P1 * - P2"<) /
10,000 - x1
* /(61.( + S2*)J
+ 7.:1" / (°f + 62'*) 0: 1/S(P2* - 51) (200 - 1'1* - 1'2*)'
- 42-
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